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been committed—no country despoiled. There is a common scandal in Egypt that the obelisk was pulled down at the “inspiration of some private enterprise,” and Mr. Salvago, who was then the United States consular agent, affirms most positively that he paid away the sum of £600 sterling as a share claimed for services rendered in the purchase of the steamer “Dessouk” from the Egyptian Government, which steamer was destined to transport the obelisk to America; and Salvago means to say that there were two prices for the “Dessouk,” one which Mr. Vanderbilt paid and the other which the Egyptian Government received. Mr. Salvago says he knows to whom he gave this money, a kind of “boodle,” and Mr. Vanderbilt should call upon him to tell. In any event it adds nothing to the glory of the manner in which the obelisk has been acquired, and may cause the monument itself to tingle anew with shame.

Who shall say that the acknowledged disintegration of the obelisk now is not due to the interposition of some avenging spirit who seeks to redress its wrongs, and thus commits its crumbling sands to winds which waft them back to its eastern home, there to commingle with the dust of ages from whence it came? Be this as it may, let us anticipate its absolute decay, and, as I have already suggested, raise a popular subscription, and “return to the despoiled and outraged city of Alexandria her lost monument. This would be an act worthy of a generous people.” This is far better than paraffine-waterproof, which only prolongs the agony. The obelisk is suffering from consumption, and only a change of climate can save it from annihilation.

CHAS. CHAILLÉ LONG.

III.

SOME MISTAKES OF REAR ADMIRAL TAYLOR.

IN the July number of your valuable periodical, Wm. Rogers Taylor, Rear Admiral U. S. N., in an article entitled “A Mistake by General Beauregard,” disagrees with my narrative published by you of the engagement of the Confederate rams “Palmetto State” and “Chicora,” on the 31st of January, 1863, with the Federal blockading fleet, then stationed off the Charleston harbor. What I said in the communication complained of was the substance of what Commodore Ingraham and Commanders Tucker and Rutledge had told me, and of what was afterwards reiterated by them in their official reports of the occurrence. I was not on board either Confederate ram on that day, but I had suggested the sortie referred to, and was one of the first to be apprised of every detail of the action. The idea never crossed my mind that any information then given me by Commodore Ingraham and the two commanders under him could ever be disputed as incorrect. Their honorable character was a sufficient guaranty of their reliability. And, in fact, I had myself—with many others—actually witnessed the result of this naval attack.

If I understand him aright, Rear Admiral Taylor denies that “the vessels composing the blockading squadron,” on that occasion, “hurriedly steamed out to sea, and entirely disappeared,” when set upon by the two Southern gunboats, and that “the entire harbor remained in the full possession” of the Confederates. And he therefore denies that the blockade of Charleston was

raised "for the time being, as certified to by Commodore Ingraham, by the foreign consuls then in Charleston, and by myself."

There is nothing new in the position assumed by Rear Admiral Taylor. What he alleges to-day has already been substantially alleged, not only by himself, but by other Federal naval commanders, and even, as it also appears, by the colonel of a Pennsylvania Militia Regiment—Colonel A. A. Lechler. The officious zeal of this gentleman is all the more remarkable that, from what he indirectly admits, he was never near the scene of action, and was merely passing on a transport, at some distance off the Charleston harbor, where he encountered the Federal fleet, evidently after its dispersion, for he fixes his arrival there at 8.30 A.M. We know that, half an hour before that moment, the "Palmetto State" and "Chicora" were already both at anchor, "leaving the partially crippled and fleeing enemy," says Commander Tucker in his report, "about seven miles clear of the bar, standing at the southward and eastward." *

Contradictory statements and denials of this nature, concerning the events of the late war, are not of unfrequent occurrence. What one side positively avers is often no less positively dissented to by the other. Thus, even to this hour, officers who had occupied high rank in the Union Army—General Sherman among them—deny that the Confederates took the Federals by surprise on the first day of the battle of Shiloh. So also does General Sherman continue even now, as I am informed, to deny that Columbia, the capital of South Carolina, was burned by his own troops.

The conclusion forced upon us is, not that General Sherman and Rear Admiral Taylor, and others who speak and write as they do, are correct in their assertions, but that, unfortunately, evidence, however authentic be its source, loses its weight and is disregarded, when coming from those who were enemies at the time of the occurrence under dispute. It follows none the less, however, that a clear comprehension and just appreciation of such contested points are, sooner or later, reached; and thus is the level of all historical facts eventually settled.

In my article referred to by Rear Admiral Taylor I never even intimated that because the Federal blockading fleet was dispersed, north and south, on the 31st January, 1863, by the Confederate rams "Palmetto State" and "Chicora," the Charleston blockade was permanently broken, and remained so to the end. I said that "*for the time being*" it was raised; and I maintain that my assertion was absolutely correct, notwithstanding the denial of Rear Admiral Taylor and of others.

After the dispersion of the blockading squadron, and as long as the two Confederate rams remained at anchor near the entrance of Beach Channel—that is to say, for more than nine hours—not one of the Federal ships was in sight. Who can, therefore, truthfully say that from 8 A.M. to 3.45 P.M. of that day (and Admiral Taylor says 5 P.M.), the blockade of Charleston was not actually broken? During that time, could not any ship or steamer desiring to

* See Colonel Lechler's letter to Rear Admiral Du Pont, in "War of the Rebellion Official Records," Series I., Vol. XIV., pp. 209, 210. See also Commander Tucker's Report, in same work, same vol., pp. 208, 209.

enter or leave the harbor have done so without molestation? Clearly the Federal fleet could not have prevented any such entrance or exit, while away from its usual place of anchorage, and, I repeat it, while out of sight of the Charleston harbor.

It is admitted that early the next morning the whole Federal fleet had resumed its habitual position. It is also conceded—nor had the point ever been contested on our part—that we did not again attempt the feat so successfully accomplished the day previous. The reasons for our inaction are given in “Military Operations of General Beauregard,” Vol. II., p. 58, where the following can be found :

“It would not be fair, however, to detract from the merits of an enterprise which, so far as it went, reflected honor on the officers and men engaged in it. It should not be forgotten that Commodore Ingraham had many serious obstacles to contend with ; first, the weakness of the machinery of the two boats ; second, their very heavy and objectionable draught ; and, third, the fact that neither could be looked upon as altogether seaworthy. But whatever may have been the causes that prevented a more brilliant result, the official statement, as made by General Beauregard, Commodore Ingraham, and the foreign consuls then on the spot, was true: the blockade of the port of Charleston, for the time being, had been raised, and the hostile fleet guarding its outer harbor had been unquestionably dispersed.”

In war, events occur and follow each other in rapid succession ; and it often happens that what was an accomplished fact in the morning ceases to be one in the evening. But because a position taken and occupied at 6 o'clock A.M., may be lost at 6 o'clock P.M. the same day, is it untrue to state that, for a specific space of time, that position was really in the possession of those who had attacked it? To propound such a question is to answer it. I was justified, therefore, and so was Commodore Ingraham, and so were the foreign consuls spoken of, in making the statement already referred to. When first published—namely, on the 31st of January—it was unquestionably true ; notwithstanding the fact that a different condition of things existed the next day. It was clearly my duty, under the circumstances, to take advantage of an opportunity which might have so materially benefited the Confederate cause in the eyes of foreign powers.

Commodore Ingraham's Report is published in full, and so is Commander Tucker's, in “War of the Rebellion Official Records,” Series I., Vol. XIV., pp. 207-209. These two papers are deserving of careful attention, and speak the honest truth, from beginning to end. The following is an extract of what Commodore Ingraham said :

“I knew our opportunity was to take the enemy unawares, as the moment he was under way, from his superior speed, we could not close with him. I then directed Lieutenant Rutledge, commanding, to require from Lieutenant-Commander Abbot” [of the United States steamer ‘*Mercedita*,’ just surrendered] “his word of honor for his commander, officers, and crew, that they would not serve against the Confederate States until regularly exchanged. . . . I then stood to the northward and eastward, and soon after made another steamer getting under way. We stood for her and fired several shots at her, but as we had to fight the vessel in a circle to bring the different guns to bear, she was soon out of range. In this way we engaged several vessels,

they keeping at long range and steering to the southward. . . . We had but little opportunity of trying our vessels, as the enemy did not close, and not a single shot struck either vessel."

The Federal ships "Augusta" and "Housatonic" may have fired "thirty-four shot and shell" at the "Palmetto State," as Rear Admiral Taylor asserts, and I have no doubt that, besides these, several other Federal vessels also fired a few retreating shots at the two Confederate rams; but all did so at very long range, and while using their utmost speed to increase the distance between them and their pursuers. In fact, their only object appeared to be to get out of the way, and avoid the fate of the "Mercedita," the "Keystone State," the "Quaker City," and others whose names were not mentioned by Commodore Ingraham and Commander Tucker. The officers in command of the ships composing the blockade of Charleston were unquestionably gallant officers, but they so little expected the sortie of the two Confederate rams, that some of them exhibited undue precipitancy and perturbation, when they realized the danger threatening them. Commodore Ingraham's report bears me out in this respect. I quote:

"After some delay Lieutenant Abbot, commanding, came on board and informed me that the vessel was the United States steamer 'Mercedita,' . . . that she was in a sinking condition, had a crew of 158, all told, and wished to be relieved; *that all boats were lowered without the plugs being in, and were full of water.*"*

The blockading squadron consisted of ten ships. Out of these, four only were engaged, it is alleged, or, rather, happened to be in direct contact with the two Confederate rams. The "Housatonic" and the "Augusta" came to the rescue, says Rear Admiral Taylor, but "*after all the damage that was done had been inflicted.*" The "Flag," "Ottawa," "Unadilla," and "Stettin," he adds, "were at the extremities of the long line, and did not get into action." I fail to see any reason for it. They could certainly have run from their anchorage and reached the scene of danger in time; for we must not forget that it took the "Palmetto State" and the "Chicora" at least two hours to cripple, capture, and otherwise damage those of the Federal ships that were too slow in getting out of their way. It strikes me that such a course on their part but confirms what Rear Admiral Taylor specially objects to in my article of May last, namely, "*that the other vessels composing the blockading squadron, seeing the fate of their consorts, and fearing the same one for themselves, hurriedly steamed out to sea and entirely disappeared.*"

I now give this passage from Commander Tucker's report:

" . . . Commenced the action at 5.30 A.M., by firing into a schooner-rigged propeller, which we set on fire, and have reason to believe sunk, as she was nowhere to be seen at daylight. We then engaged a large side-wheel steamer, twice our length from us, on the port bow, firing three shots into her with telling effect, when she made a run for it. This vessel was supposed to be the 'Quaker City.' We then engaged a schooner-rigged propeller and a large side-wheel steamer, partially crippling both, and setting on fire the latter, causing her to strike her flag. At this time the latter vessel, supposed to be the

* The italics are mine.

'Keystone State,' was completely at my mercy, having a raking position astern, distance some 200 yards. I at once gave the order to cease firing upon her, and directed Lieutenant Bier, First Lieutenant of the 'Chicora,' to man a boat and take charge of the prize; if possible, to save her. If that was not possible, to rescue the crew.* While the boat was in the act of being manned I discovered that she was endeavoring to make her escape by working her starboard wheel, the other being disabled. Her colors being down, I at once started in pursuit and renewed the engagement. Owing to her superior steaming qualities she soon widened the distance to some 2,000 yards. She then hoisted her flag and commenced firing her rifled gun, her commander, by this faithless act, placing himself beyond the pale of civilized and honorable warfare."

It is proper, I think, to state here, that Rear Admiral Taylor, while narrating this important incident of the engagement, transforms it into a praiseworthy effort on the part of the officer commanding the "Keystone State," and, singularly enough, throws the whole odium of the breach of faith committed on Commander Tucker.

The latter goes on to say, in his report :

"We next engaged two schooners, one brig and one bark-rigged propeller, but not having the requisite speed, were unable to bring them to close quarters. We pursued them six or seven miles seaward. During the engagement (toward its termination) I was engaged at long range, with a bark-rigged steam sloop-of-war, but in spite of all our efforts was unable to bring her to close quarters, owing to her superior steaming qualities."

What Rear Admiral Taylor quotes from a book which, he says, was written by Captain William Harmar Parker, formerly "First Lieutenant of the 'Palmetto State,'" amounts to very little—if to anything—and is far from conveying the meaning which is erroneously given to it. I never saw the book referred to, and am loth to judge of its merits from the few extracts inserted in Rear Admiral Taylor's article. But to what conclusion does the admiral wish to force us, even admitting that Captain Parker disapproved of the proclamation published by Commodore Ingraham and myself, and characterized as "*foolish*" the statement attributed to the British Consul and the commander of the British war steamer "Petrel"? That would merely be Captain Parker's opinion, which, if honest—though groundless—he certainly had the right to express. It is, however, but an opinion, and not, in the remotest degree, an historical fact.

* "We, the undersigned, certify that a steamer (side-wheel) supposed to be the 'Keystone State,' not only struck her flag on the morning of January 31st, but that we saw a number of her men rush upon the after part of her deck and extend their arms toward us in an imploring manner, she being at that time completely at our mercy, distant from us some 200 yards.

"G. H. BIER,

"*C. S. Navy, First Lieutenant and Exec. Officer Chicora.*

"W. T. GLASSEL, *Lieutenant.*

"BENJAMIN F. SHELBY,

"*Squadron Quartermaster.*"

"War of the Rebellion Official Records," Series I., Vol. XIV., p. 209.

Captain Parker may also have said that, "as we entered the harbor the Federal vessels closed in and resumed their position." He may have seen what others failed to discover. But he could not have said or written anywhere in his book that, *before* the two Confederate rams entered the inner harbor, the Federal vessels reoccupied their usual place of anchorage; for he was himself on one of the two Confederate vessels, and knew, as well as Commodore Ingraham, as well as Commanders Tucker and Rutledge, and all the other officers and men, that such was not the case.

Again, Captain Parker is quoted as having said that "the proclamation in regard to the blockade being broken he looked upon as *all bosh*. No vessels went out or came in during the day." That such was the case proves only that there were no vessels ready then to come in or go out of Charleston. Had there been any, as I have already shown, nothing would have stopped them. Nor should it be forgotten that Captain Parker's trivial expression does not constitute a fact, and in no wise touches upon the question involved.

Captain Parker's final opinion, that "this was a badly managed affair on our part," and that "we did not make the best use of our opportunity," is partially correct. I agree with him that we could and should have accomplished more, had Commodore Ingraham been less generous towards the Federal ships that had struck their flags and surrendered to him and to Commander Tucker. I have explained, in another part of this paper, what were the additional causes which intervened to prevent a more complete success.

Before taking leave of this subject I desire to add that the Federal blockading fleet was rendered so uneasy and inefficient by the result of the attack made upon it on the 31st of January, 1863, that, for days and weeks afterwards, it was matter of no difficulty for blockade runners to enter or leave the port with almost entire freedom, as is shown by the following dispatch:

CHARLESTON, S. C., *February* 14, 1863.

To General Cooper, Richmond, Va.: Steamers "Ruby," "Leopard," and "T. D. Wagner" arrived, and "Douglas" left safely, during last night. Have called attention of foreign consuls formally to fact.

THOMAS JORDAN, *Chief of Staff*.

If this could be done after the blockading squadron had resumed its position, no argument is necessary to show that while it was away from it—as was the case on the 31st of January—ingress and egress to and from the harbor of Charleston was open to all.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

NEW ORLEANS, *August* 29th, 1886.

IV.

PROGRESS OF COLORADO.

THE anonymous author of the able article upon the American "House of Lords," which appeared in the May number of THE REVIEW, speaks of Colorado as follows:

"Colorado is not a State of homes, and it never will be a populous State. Like Nevada, it is a district of miners' cabins and cowboys' huts, of revolvers and canned fruits."